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I.  Whether the Fourth Amendment protection against excessive force extends beyond 
initial seizure? 
 
II.  If the Court were to apply a rule of continuing seizure to the Fourth Amendment 
protection against the use of excessive force, to what point beyond initial seizure 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The court of appeals entered judgment on March 15, 2010. (R. at 16).  Petitioner filed his 
petition for writ of certiorari on May 15, 2010. (R. at 17).  This Court granted the petition on 
October 7, 2010. (R. at 18).  This Court’s jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1) (2000).  A 
district court’s fact findings and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from them are reviewed 
for clear error.  Its legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are the 
relevant provisions and are reproduced in the addendum to this brief. 
 STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 On September 23, 2008, John Marlin (“Marlin”), a police officer employed by 
Respondent Fair County Police Department, pulled Beau Radley (“Radley”) over on the 
suspicion that Radley was driving drunk. (R. at 3).  Marlin took Radley into custody and 
transported Radley to the Fair Police Station after Radley refused to take a breathalyzer test. (R. 
at 3).  Upon arriving at the police station, Marlin escorted Radley into the booking room and 
handed Radley off to Respondent Officer Arthur Goode (“Goode”).  (R. at 3).  Marlin exited the 
booking room leaving Radley in the sole custody of Goode. (R. at 3).  Goode removed Radley’s 
handcuffs for the booking process and re-cuffed Radley upon completion; however, Radley 
complained that the handcuffs were too tight. (R. at 3).  When Marlin returned, Radley 
complained again, and Marlin loosened the handcuffs. (R. at 3).  Goode then escorted Radley, 
without Marlin, to a holding cell where Radley alleges Goode pushed and hit Radley (R. at 3).  
Hours later Radley was examined at the Fair County Hospital. (R. at 3).  Radley’s wrists were 
bruised and he had a cut lip and bruising along his jaw. (R. at 4). 
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Radley filed a civil action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
Fair against Respondents for deprivation of his rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (R. at 2) alleging 
violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by Respondents’ use of excessive 
force. (R. at 4).  The District Court granted Respondents’ motion to dismiss the Fourth 
Amendment component of Radley’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted. (R. at 11).  The Fifteenth Circuit Court affirmed the decision of the 
District Court. (R. at 16).  Radley’s petition for writ of certiorari to this Court was granted on 
October 7, 2010. (R. at 18).  Respondents respectfully request this Court uphold the decision of 
the Fifteenth Circuit Court of Appeals and dismiss Radley’s claim. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I 
The Fifteenth Circuit did not err in affirming the District Court’s dismissal of the Fourth 
Amendment component of Radley’s excessive use of force claim. The Fourth Amendment 
protects against unreasonable seizures.  However, Fourth Amendment protection does not extend 
past initial seizure because seizure is “a single act” and not “a continuous fact.” Nevertheless, 
some courts subscribe to the idea of continuing seizure but do not agree as to where seizure ends 
and pretrial detention begins.  Although Graham provides support for the idea of continuing 
seizure, the facts in Graham are not sufficiently analogous to the case at bar to control the 
outcome.  The concept of continuing seizure is illogical and is at best a legal fiction.  A 
distinction should be made between the act of seizure and the state of seizure.  The Fourth 
Amendment is directed at the act of seizure and not at the conditions of seizure.  The moment 
Radley was seized, he became a pretrial detainee.  As a pretrial detainee, Radley’s excessive use 
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of force claim falls under the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment and not the Fourth 
Amendment.   
II 
In the event that  this Court favors continuing seizure over initial seizure, Fourth 
Amendment protection should cease once the detainee is no longer in the custody of the arresting 
officer or officers.  The arresting officer rule finds support in the jurisprudence of this Court and 
is not inconsistent with Graham.  Furthermore, the Second, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits explicitly 
espouse and follow the arresting officer rule.  Finally, the arresting officer rule would provide 
much needed consistency, is easy to follow, and makes sense. Radley’s claim does not survive 
under the arresting officer rule and should be dismissed. 
I. FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION AGAINST EXCESSIVE FORCE DOES 
NOT EXTEND BEYOND INITIAL SEIZURE. 
 
A. The interpretation of the concept of seizure and the application of Fourth 
Amendment protection to excessive force claims after Graham has not been 
consistent. 
 
 Analysis of excessive force claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 begin by identifying 
the allegedly infringed constitutional right.  Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989).  
Hence, when a plaintiff files an excessive force claim, a court must first determine whether the 
plaintiff’s claim is governed by the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendment.  See Riley 
v. Dorton, 115 F. 3d 1159, 1161 (4th Cir. 1997). The Fourth Amendment protects free citizens 
against unreasonable searches and seizures. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 394.  Excessive force 
claims that arise in the context of an investigatory stop or arrest of a free citizen must be 
analyzed within the contours of the Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 394 (discussing Tennessee v. 
Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985)) (making explicit the implicit analysis in Garner that all claims of 
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excessive force by law enforcement officers’ “seizure” be analyzed under the “reasonableness” 
standard of the Fourth Amendment).   
 According to Graham, seizure by government actors which restrains the liberty of a free 
citizen through a showing of authority or physical force triggers Fourth Amendment protections.  
Id. at 395 n.10 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.1 (1968)).  However, Graham did not resolve 
whether Fourth Amendment protection against deliberate excessive physical force continues to 
apply beyond the ending point of arrest and the beginning of pretrial detention.  Id.  Graham also 
did not specify at what point arrest ends and pretrial detention begins.  Id. (The Court  referred to 
the ending point of arrest but did not actually define it when declining to answer whether the 
Fourth Amendment continues to apply after arrest).  Graham’s open-endedness has led to a split 
amongst the circuit courts with regard to the application of the Fourth Amendment to excessive 
use of force claims by individuals who have been seized.  See generally Riley, 115 F.3d 1159 
(providing an overview of the split with reference to specific circuits).  
 A critical and much disputed issue amongst the circuit courts is whether the Fourth 
Amendment continues to apply after initial seizure. See generally, id.  Initial seizure is the idea 
that seizure is limited to the initial act of seizing. Riley, 115 F.3d at 1163 (citing Wilkins v. May, 
872 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1989)).  Courts holding that the Fourth Amendment applies after initial 
seizure espouse the idea of continuing seizure. Id. at 1162.  Continuing seizure is the idea that 
seizure does not end at the point of arrest but continues while the person is in custody.  Id.  
Respondents hold, with Riley, that the concept of continuing seizure is out-of-place given this 
Court’s definition of seizure. See id. at 1163. (Seizure is “a single act”) (quoting Thompson v. 
Whitman, 85 U.S. 457 (1873)). 
B. This Court’s definition of seizure does not support the idea of continuing seizure. 
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 In Thompson, 85 U.S. at 470, this Court defined seizure as “a single act” explicitly stating 
seizure is “not a continuous fact.”  Thompson is about seizure of property; however, the simple 
language of the Fourth Amendment applies equally to seizures of persons and property.  Payton 
v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980).  According to this Court, a Fourth Amendment seizure 
occurs when the government intentionally terminates an individual’s freedom of movement.  
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 (2007) (citing Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 
(1989)).  Hence, it follows that once a law enforcement officer has seized a person by 
intentionally terminating that person’s freedom of movement, the single act of detention has been 
effectuated and seizure has been completed.  See Robles v. Prince George’s County, Md., 302 
F.3d 262, 268 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing Riley, 115 F.3d).  A person who has been detained through 
intentional termination of movement remains seized but the act of seizure has ended since 
seizure itself is not a “continuous fact.”  See Thompson, 85 U.S. at 470 (1873).  It is the 
possession following the seizure and not the seizure that is continuous.  Id. at 470.  Thus, once 
Radley was handcuffed by Marlin (R. at 3), Radley’s seizure came to an end although Radley 
was in fact seized since Radley was in the custody or possession of Marlin.   
 The Fourth Amendment does not apply to Radley’s excessive use of force claim because 
Radley became a pretrial detainee once his seizure was effectuated.  See Riley, 115 F.3d at 1163 
(citing Brothers v. Klevenhagen, 28 F.3d 452 (5th Cir. 1994)) (holding that an individual that has 
been arrested and placed in police custody becomes a pretrial detainee protected by the Due 
Process Clause).  This Court has held that the Due Process Clause provides pretrial detainees 
with protection from use of force that is excessive amounting to punishment.  Graham, 490 U.S. 
at 395 n.10. (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979)). 
C. While Graham implies that the concept of continuing seizure is valid, Graham’s 




 Despite this Court’s definition of seizure in Thompson, this Court’s holding in Graham, 
suggests that initial seizure extends beyond the act of seizure. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 
(holding that all excessive force claims against law enforcement officers during the course of a 
seizure of a citizen who is free such as an arrest or investigatory stop be analyzed under the 
reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment and not the substantive due process 
approach).  Dethorne Graham (“Graham”) had already been effectively seized when the alleged 
excessive use of force occurred because his freedom of movement had intentionally been 
terminated when one of the arriving officers placed Graham in handcuffs.  Id. at 389. However, 
Graham, unlike Radley, was detained briefly during an investigatory stop that did not result in 
arrest and much less in pretrial detention.  Id. at 389.  Graham was not arrested but only detained 
while the officer who stopped him ascertained whether or not his suspicions were valid.  Id.  
Radley, on the other hand, was arrested and transported to the police station where he was 
booked and jailed. (R. at 3).  Graham’s seizure occurred in pre-arrest mode and as such 
Graham’s seizure does not fall within the much disputed “legal twilight zone,” a term coined by 
the Fifth Circuit court referring to the point between arrest and sentencing.  Wilson v. Spain, 209 
F.3d 713, 715 (8th Cir. 2000). 
D. The Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuit Courts have ascertained in rejecting the 
idea of continuing seizure and have properly refused to apply Fourth 
Amendment protection past initial seizure. 
 
 The Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuit Courts espouse initial seizure while the Second, 
Sixth, and Ninth Circuit Courts do not.  See generally, Riley, 115 F.3d at 1163-64.  The courts 
that reject the concept of initial seizure agree that seizure extends beyond initial seizure but do 
not agree where it ends.  See Valencia v. Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440, 1444-45 (5th Cir.1993).  The 
Fifth Circuit, for example, explained that the Fourth Amendment text prohibiting unreasonable 
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seizures does not lend support to its application in a post-arrest encounter.  Id. at 1163 (citing 
Brothers, 28 F.3d 452).  The Seventh Circuit had previously endorsed this position. Id. (citing 
Wilkins, 872 F.2d 190).  
 The courts that reject the idea of “continuing seizure” are correct.  See generally, Riley, 
115 F.3d. 1159.  First, as mentioned above, the Supreme Court has defined seizure as “a single 
act” instead of “a continuous fact.”  Thompson, 85 U.S. at 470.  Second, as the Fourth Circuit 
pointed out, a review of the basic jurisprudence of the Supreme Court reveals decades of 
precedent pertaining to the Fourth Amendment focusing on initial deprivation of liberty.  Riley, 
115 F.3d at 1162 (citing seventeen sources spanning the 1950’s to the 1990’s).  It follows then 
that the Fourth Amendment is not directed at the conditions of custody but rather at the act of 
arrest. See id. at 1163.  Third, one should look at the plain meaning of the word “seizure” itself to 
see that the idea of “continuing seizure” is flawed and is at best a legal fiction.  See Wilkins, 872 
F.2d at 192-193.  A legal fiction is an assumption that though something may be untrue, it is true 
for the purpose of altering the operation of a legal rule within the process of judicial reasoning. 
Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009).  However, fictio juris non est ubi veritas.  Respondents 
implore this Court rule accordingly.  
 A natural interpretation would limit the word “seizure” to the act of initial seizing 
meaning that subsequent events happened after and not during the seizure. Wilkins, 872 F.2d at 
192-93.  Consequently, any excessive use of force events occurring after initial seizure would be 
outside the scope of the Fourth Amendment because these events would not have occurred 
within the act of seizing. Id.  Finally, the Fifth Circuit held that the Fourth Amendment does not 
provide an appropriate constitutional basis after completion of the incidents of arrest; after 
release of the plaintiff from the custody of the arresting officer; and, after the plaintiff had been 
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awaiting trial in detention for a period of time which is significant.  Valencia, 981 F.2d at 1443-
44.     
 The Seventh Circuit pointed out that the Fourth Amendment is inapt after arrest since the 
scope of its inquiry is the reasonableness of the force used in seizing and restraining a suspect in 
relation to the danger the suspect poses to the officer handling the arrest and to the surrounding 
community. Wilkins, 872 F.2d at 193-94.  The Wilkins Court concluded that once the officer has 
custody over the suspect, the issue is moot. Id. The Fourth Circuit would agree.  See Orem v. 
Rephann, 523 F.3d 442, 449 (4th Cir. 2008) (refusing to apply the Fourth Amendment in a 
situation where the officer used a taser on an unruly suspect while she was in the back seat of the 
squad car).  The Orem Court held that since the suspect had been arrested when the officer used 
his taser, the act of seizure was complete. Id. The Fourth Circuit’s holding in Orem is consistent 
with the Fourth Circuit’s previous holding in Robles.  In Robles, police officers tied a suspect to 
a metal pole after his arrest after the county that had issued his warrant refused to retrieve him 
from the arresting officers.  See Robles, 302 F.3d at 267.  The Robles Court held that since the 
arrest had been completed when the incident took place, and since the arrest complied with the 
safeguards of the Fourth Amendment, the Fourth Amendment did not extend because the suspect 
was then a pretrial detainee.  Id. at 269.   
 The Fifth Circuit has given the following reasons for not adopting the idea of continuing 
seizure and thus not applying the Fourth Amendment to pretrial detainees’ excessive force 
claims.  The Fourth Amendment’s lack of textual support to the post-arrest encounter; the 
Supreme Court’s refusal to apply Fourth Amendment protection to inmates after incarceration; 
and, the holding in Graham and Bell that the appropriate constitutional basis is the Due Process 
Clause with regard to excessive force suits by pretrial detainees.  Riley, 115 F.3d at 1163 (citing 
9 
 
Brothers, 28 F.3d 452) (holding that an individual that has been arrested and placed in police 
custody becomes a pretrial detainee protected by the Due Process Clause). 
 Justice Ginsburg has argued that application of the Fourth Amendment is justified under 
“continuing seizure” contending that a person’s seizure ends not after arrest but continues to the 
end of trial. Riley, 115 F.3d 1159 at 1162 (citing Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 
(1994)(Ginsburg, J., concurring)). However, Justice Ginsburg’s argument is contrary to Supreme 
Court precedent.  Id.  (citing Bell, 441 U.S. 520) (holding that pretrial detainees’ excessive force 
claims should be analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause). 
 Radley became a pretrial detainee when his seizure ended the moment he was lawfully 
arrested by Marlin. See Riley, 115 F.3d at 1161-62 (quoting e.g., United States v. Cobb, 905 F.2d 
784 (4th Cir. 1990); Cooper v. Dyke, 814 F.2d 941 (4th Cir. 1987)) (holding that a person who 
has been arrested lawfully and is being held before guilt is formally adjudicated is a pretrial 
detainee).  In light of the Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuit Courts’ reasoning, Respondents 
maintain that Radley should be classified as a pretrial detainee.  As such, Fourth Amendment 
protection does not apply, and Radley’s claim should be dismissed.   
E. The concept of continuing seizure cannot be logically sustained. 
 
 While legal precedent has not clearly established whether seizure ends with the act of 
seizing or whether seizure continues after the act of seizing, it is inherent in the meaning of the 
word seizure itself to interpret it to mean initial seizure. See Wilkins, 872 F.2d at 192-93. There 
can be no such thing as continuous seizure in terms of action because the act of seizure ends once 
the individual has been seized.  See Thompson, 85 U.S. at 470.  The fact that a person is seized 
does not mean that he or she is in the act of being seized. See id. at 470 (distinguishing between 
seizure and possession following seizure). One should distinguish between the act of seizure and 
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the state of seizure. See id.  To exemplify the distinction between the act of seizure and the state 
of seizure, consider the case of a person who has been convicted and is serving the tenth year of 
a lengthy prison sentence.  This person has long since been seized and is in a state of seizure, yet 
this Court has held that the Eighth Amendment governs a claim of excessive use of force and not 
the Fourth Amendment.  Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 n.10 (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 
(1986)).  In plain terms, once the seizure of a free person has happened, the act of seizure is over 
and the Fourth Amendment no longer applies. See id.  
  Respondents do not dispute that Radley was seized.  However, Respondents respectfully 
point out that it is not enough that Radley was in a state of seizure when the alleged use of 
excessive force occurred for the Fourth Amendment to apply.  By the time that Goode allegedly 
injured Radley, the act of seizure had already been completed because Radley had already been 
seized by Marlin. (R. at 3). 
II. IF THE COURT WERE TO APPLY A RULE OF CONTINUING SEIZURE TO 
FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION AGAINST THE USE OF EXCESSIVE 
FORCE, FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION SHOULD CEASE AS SOON 
AS THE DETAINEE OR ARRESTEE IS NO LONGER UNDER THE CUSTODY 
OF THE ARRESTING OFFICER OR OFFICERS. 
 
A. The arresting officer rule finds support in this Court’s jurisprudence and is not 
inconsistent with Graham. 
 
 That Graham provides support for the idea of continuing seizure cannot be denied.  
However, Fourth Amendment protection against use of excessive force should not apply once the 
detainee is no longer in the custody of the arresting officer or officers. Valencia, 981 F.2d at 
1444. The arresting officer rule, as described in the preceding sentence, is not inconsistent with 
Graham based on the facts of the case.  In Graham, the use of excessive force occurred while 
Graham was still in custody of the officer that seized him. Graham, 490 U.S. at 389.  A textual 
reading of the case reveals that Graham was handcuffed tightly by the officer that seized him 
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implying that excessive force was used both in the course of seizing Graham and after Graham 
was seized when Graham’s face was shoved against the hood of the car.  Id.  Only a short 
amount of time had elapsed between applying the handcuffs to shoving Graham against the car 
hood.  Id.  Graham was in the same location under the dominion of the same officers including 
the officer that handcuffed him when he was injured.  Id.  In contrast, more time had elapsed 
since Radley had been seized.  In addition, Radley was no longer at the location where he had 
been seized or under the dominion of the officer who had seized him when the alleged excessive 
use of force occurred against Radley. (R. at 3).  Again, at the risk of appearing redundant but for 
the sake of emphasis, Graham had not been transferred into the custody of another officer during 
the excessive use of force incident. Id.  Radley, on the other hand, was no longer in the custody 
of the officer that arrested him when the alleged use of force occurred. (R. at 3).  In Fontana v. 
Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 880 (9th Cir. 2001), the Ninth Circuit concluded that the plaintiff’s 
excessive use of force claim should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment because the 
plaintiff was in the custody and “continuing dominion” of the arresting officer.  Since Radley 
was not in the custody and continuing dominion of the arresting officer when his right to be free 
from excessive force was allegedly violated, the Fourth Amendment is not the appropriate 
constitutional standard by which to analyze Radley’s claim. 
 Graham reaffirms in its dicta Garner’s holding that that both when a particular seizure is 
made and how it is carried out determine the “reasonableness” of a particular seizure. Id. at 395 
(citing Garner, 471 U.S. 1).  The Graham Court goes on to say that under Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence, the right to arrest comes with the right to use physical coercion to some degree.  
Id. at 396 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. 1).  Furthermore, Graham recognized that some allowance 
must be made when calculating reasonableness for the fact police officers have to often make 
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split-second judgments.  Id. at 396-97.   An obvious implication of the analysis provided by the 
Graham Court is that a Fourth Amendment seizure often begins with a law enforcement officer’s 
decision to initiate the seizure.  It is also the officer who effectuates the seizure that determines 
how much physical coercion to apply.  See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97.  The arresting officer 
controls the initial seizure and the immediate conditions of that seizure.  See Fontana, 262 F.3d 
at 880-81.  Once the arresting officer hands the arrestee over to another officer, the conditions of 
the arrestee’s seizure are no longer controlled by the arresting officer. See id.  It makes sense to 
extend Fourth Amendment protection from the point that a law enforcement officer or officers 
takes a person into custody through the time the person remains in that officer’s or officers’ 
custody in light of the officer’s or officers’ continuing dominion over the person that has just 
been taken into custody.  Marlin’s continuing dominion over Radley ceased when Marlin left 
Radley with Goode.  (R. at 3). 
 Furthermore, this Court has suggested in its dicta that after police officers effectuate a 
seizure under the Fourth Amendment, the Fourth Amendment may apply while the suspect is 
under the control of the police officers. Kathryn R. Urbonya, “Accidental" Shootings As Fourth 
Amendment Seizures, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q., 337, 374 (1992) (citing California v. Hodari 
D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991)). This Court briefly touched on the idea of a continuing arrest when this 
Court explained that if a suspect escaped after an officer stopped the suspect through the use of 
physical force, there may have been an arrest but not a continuing arrest.  Id.  In other words, the 
Court recognized there would have been a continuing seizure while the suspect remained with 
the arresting officer. Id.  




 The Second, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have explicitly based their decision to apply the 
Fourth Amendment based on the arrestee being in the custody of the arresting officer when the 
alleged excessive force occurred.  E.g., Phelps v. Coy, 286 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 2002); 
Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 879 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Robins v. Harum, 773 F.2d 1004 
(9th Cir. 1985)); Powell v. Gardner, 891 F.2d 1039, 1044 (2d Cir. 1989).  The fact that the 
Second, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits subscribe to the arresting officer rule and explicitly state that 
they do provides support for this Court’s affirmation of that rule. 
C. The arresting officer rule not only makes sense but provides an easy to follow 
bright line rule. 
 Clearly, the lower courts have not been ruling consistently with regard to excessive use of 
force claims.  Even the courts that agree with the idea of continuing seizure have come to 
different conclusions with regard to the point at where seizure ends.  See Valencia 981 F.2d 
at1444-45.  Disagreement amongst the lower courts has led to disparate holdings despite 
analogous circumstances even within the same circuits. Mitchell W. Karsh, Excessive Force and 
the Fourth Amendment:  When Does Seizure End?, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 823., 823-24 (1990).  
Easy to follow bright line rules that mark the boundary between seizure and detention are needed 
for the sake of consistency and fairness.  Id. at 827-29.   
 The arresting officer rule provides a clear and easy to follow bright line rule which would 
promote consistency amongst the courts when deciding cases involving excessive use of force 
claims against law enforcement officers.  The application of the arresting officer rule makes 
sense because as the Sixth Circuit put it, the “murky area” of whether the Fourth or Fourteenth 
Amendment applies does not begin while the arrestee is still in the custody of the arresting 
officers.  See Phelps, 286 F.3d 295 at 300.  If the excessive use of force occurs while the arrestee 
is still in the custody of the arresting officer or officers, the Fourth Amendment would apply.  Id.  
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Conversely, if the excessive use of force occurs after the arrestee is no longer in the custody of 
the arresting officer or officers, then the Fourth Amendment would not apply. Id. at 301 (citing 
Valencia, 981 F.2d 1440).  Consistent with the Sixth Circuit’s analysis in Phelps, Respondents 
hold that because Radley was no longer in the custody of his arresting officer when he sustained 
injuries resulting from alleged use of excessive force (R. at 3), Radley had already crossed over 
into the “murky area”, and as a result, his claim should be analyzed against the standards of the 
Fourteenth Amendment instead of the Fourth Amendment. 
 While it may be argued that the arresting officer rule is not equitable because some 
arrestees will enjoy protection for a greater period of time than others, the simplicity of the rule’s 
comprehensibility and application is appealing.  A simple rule is preferred over a complex rule 
since the bright line needed is one that “irradiates” and not “bedazzles.”  Karsch, supra, at 829 
(citing Wayne R. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World:  On Drawing “Bright 
Lines” and “Good Faith”, 43 U. PITT  L. REV., 307, 327 (1982).  It is impossible to ensure that 
every arrestee be held in the custody of the arresting officer or officers for the same length of 
time.  Indeed, it would be preposterous to be held to such a high and inefficient standard in the 
face of impossibility! How long the arrestee remains in the custody of the arresting officer or 
officers will depend on the circumstances of the particular case.  Once an arrestee is no longer in 
the custody of the arresting officer or officers, initial seizure would unequivocally be over, and 
Fourth Amendment protection would no longer apply. 
CONCLUSION 
 Radley’s excessive use of force claim should not be analyzed under the reasonableness 
standard of the Fourth Amendment because the Fourth Amendment does not apply past initial 
seizure. The Fourth Amendment is directed towards the act of seizure and not the state of 
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seizure.  Radley had already been seized when the alleged excessive use of force incident 
occurred.  Once Radley was seized, Radley became a pretrial detainee and the Fourth 
Amendment was no longer applicable.  In the alternative, under the concept of continuing 
seizure, Radley’s claim also fails under the arresting officer rule.  The arresting officer rule 
should be applied because it makes sense given that the arresting officer or officers carry out the 
arrest and exert continuing dominion over the arrestee or detainee until the arrestee or detainee is 
left in the custody of another officer.  Furthermore, the arresting officer rule provides a clear 
boundary as to where seizure ends and pretrial detention begins.   
PRAYER 
 For these reasons, Respondents pray the Court affirm the decision of the Fifteenth Circuit 
and dismiss Radley’s claim. 
 Respectfully submitted, this 11th day of March, 2011. 
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FOURTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any 
state or territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of 
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured 
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any 
action brought against a judicial officer for an act of omission taken in such officer’s judicial 
capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or 
declaratory relief was unavailable.  For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress 
applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the 
District of Columbia.  
